Tenure Rights and Ancestral Domains in the Philippines

A Study of the Roots of Conflict
The tragedy of colonization in the Philippines is that it created a country but splintered a people. 1 It unified a scattering of self-ruling communities into a single state but divided its citizens into those who acquired power from colonization and those who lost power because they avoided colonization (Duhaylungsod 1996; Lynch 1984) .
Colonization consolidated the Philippines into a political unit when it became a colony of Spain after Magellan claimed the entire Mas de Filipinas for the Spanish king in 1521 (Douglas 1970) . The present Philippine republic emerged by revolutionary declaration from the Spanish colonial claim in 1898 but was unable to function as a free political entity because of subsequent colonial suppression by the United States following its defeat of Spain in 1899. The Americans ultimately gave up the territory in 1946, however, and the Philippines became an independent and sovereign state.
Colonization divided the Filipino people into two groups, each with a different experience of colonization. The first group comprises the 'C-Filipinos', the colonized. They were co-opted by and collaborated with the colonial regime. They cross-bred with the colonial rulers, became acculturated into colonial ways, were christianized and were often coastal in their settlement pattern. The second group comprises the 'I-Filipinos', who were generally considered to be politically irrelevant. They were often impoverished because of economic and political marginalization, indigenous in their ways, often inland in their habitation, and generally successful in keeping their cultures intact in the face of colonization. Duhaylungsod (1996) refers to this effect of colonization as the cultural minorirization of the indigenous peoples of the Philippines.
C-Filipinos suffered while under colonization, but after colonization they reaped the benefits of being heirs to colonial powers and privileges. I-Filipinos generally did not suffer under the colonial masters, but after the masters left they suffered losses in opportunities and political influence. C-Filipinos ended up empowered because they experienced colonization. I-Filipinos ended up disenfranchized precisely because they evaded colonization.
This article analyses the legitimacy of the ancestral domain claims of IFilipinos today, from the perspective of the historical, political and legal foundations of the modern Philippine state. The analysis centres on the conflict between C-and I-Filipinos regarding the rights and tenure of indigenous peoples over their ancestral domains, within a republic created on the basis of colonial claims. This article is exploratory. My aim in writing it is to develop alternative points of view in order to understand the roots of the conflict over ancestral domains in the Philippines, rather than to offer a single solution to the current policy debate in the country on whether or not ancestral claims could or should be accorded recognition by the state.
The article is divided into three parts. The first section describes the issues related to ancestral domains as a policy question in the Philippines today. Secton two discusses three approaches to understanding the issues: historical, political and legal. The third section analyses the policy options that the Philippine government could take to resolve the issues.
Issues related to ancestral domains in the Philippines
'Ancestral domain' is the term used by the government of the Philippines to refer to the land and resources which indigenous peoples have traditionally used as their area of domicile and the basis of their economic and social life (DENR 1993; TABAK 1990) . It refers to 'the lands and resources that Indigenous Peoples have known, relied upon and protected across generations through time, which provide the economic basis for their survival as individuals and communities, help define political and social roles of each member, serve as the context within which cultural interactions are transacted, and are the cradle of their identity, consciousness and spirituality' (A. Gatmay tan 1992).
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Ancestral domains are usually located in the uplands. These are lands that 3 Indigenous peoples themselves do not usually use the term 'ancestral domain'; they consider 'land' to be an integral entity and indivisible from the resources that 'define' the land. Indigenous peoples view themselves as being inseparable from their land. They, define the land as much as the lands define them ; Conklin 1957; Schlegel 1979; Lynch 1984 see also Pagusara 1983 are legally defined in the Philippines as being hilly and mountainous, with an average slope of at least 18 percent (A. Gatmaytan 1992; Lynch 1984) . Uplands constitute about 62 percent of the total land area of the Philippines, comprising some 16.63 million hectares altogether (Lynch 1984) .
There are over a hundred indigenous groups in the Philippines (NCCP 1990; Duhaylungsod 1996) . They were previously called 'tribal Filipinos', 'cultural or ethnic minorities' and 'indigenous cultural communities'. They usually do not include the major lowland ethno-linguistic groups like the Tagalog, Ilokano, Bisayan and Bikol (A. Gatmaytan 1992; Lynch 1984) . The groups usually live in mountain enclaves (TABAK 1990; BFD-UDP 1981) , spread over virtually all the major islands of the Philippines (Sajise 1981) . Their communities have either arisen from or have sustained themselves in their traditional domains since before the Spanish came in 1521 (Fernandez 1976; Phelan 1959) . Maceda (1974) divides indigenous groups in the Philippines into five categories: 1. traditional Negrito hunter-gatherers; 2. Negritos in transition; 3. upland shifting cultivators; 4. upland wet-rice cultivators; and 5. Islamicized groups. All are unhispanicized uplanders. Lynch (1984) (TABAK 1990) . This article classifies the groups into three categories: 1. high altitude northern mountain peoples (Bontok, Ifugao, Kalinga, Isneg, Kalinga, Ibaloi, Kankaney); 2. lower altitude tropical mountain groups (Mangyan, Batak, Aeta, Mindanao Lumads); and 3. near-shore and island groups (Samal, Ivatan, Tausug). There are roughly eight to ten million indigenous people in the Philippines today (Duhaylungsod 1996; Lynch 1984) .
After the present Philippine republic began functioning as a sovereign state in 1946, indigenous groups began seeking the right to control access to and use of their ancestral domains. They have expressed the desire to determine how their traditional lands and resources are to be utilized and disposed of, in a manner consistent with their view of what is beneficial to them (A. Gatmaytan 1992) . This desire arose after exploitation of their lands and resources intensified in the years following World War II and access to them became a matter of political largesse. Opposition and resistance to those who were given access was often met by brutal police action (Vitug 1993; Tribal Forum 1982) .
The issues attending ancestral claims in the Philippines are multifaceted and complex. The most fundamental is how the claims should be honoured in the face of the regalian doctrine of state authority. The doctrine prescribes that the authority of the Philippine republic extends throughout its territory, such that all lands and natural resources found in the territory are under the power of the state. The state alone may dispose of lands and resources in the country, and unless they have been so disposed of by the state they shall remain the property of the state. Only the state may alienate and dispose of the lands and resources in the public domain and assign the same for private use and consumption. 4 The question is, should the state alienate huge tracts of otherwise residual public lands in the Philippines for the consumption and use by indigenous peoples and thereby forfeit control over the disposition of the resources found in these lands? While the state is mandated by the Constitution to 'protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social and cultural well-being' (Philippine Constitution Article XII, section 4), should it 'surrender' its sovereignty over the domains and thereby lessen its control over their disposition to serve the interests of the other citizens of the republic? Would not granting domain rights be tantamount to granting autonomy to indigenous peoples?
The question is not a mere legal nicety. There is real fear among C-Filipinos that if granted control over their ancestral domains, indigenous peoples will appropriate their natural riches to themselves. Ancestral domains cover about 65 percent of the total land area of the country, and it is in these areas that the remaining reserves of the nation's natural resources are to be found (forests, minerals, watersheds, wildlife, remaining unappropriated lands). In the eyes of the majority, the C-Filipinos, there is nothing wrong with these riches being sequestered for the citizenry of the republic -as long as they do not go to indigenous peoples.
The second issue is the identification of the claimants (Lynch 1984) . Who are indigenous peoples, precisely? How can they be identified so that others who do not share their identity will not benefit from whatever patrimony the state assigns them, if any? Migration and intermarriage have diluted the cultural and genealogical purity of individuals different groups; how 'pure' must they be to belong to a group? Again, the question is not trivial. Cases abound in which otherwise nonindigenous peoples who were born to families in Bohol or Cebu have identified themselves as Lumads of Mindanao. They negotiate certain concessions and privileges from the state (rattan cutting rights, rights to collect and process logging wastes) on behalf of real Lumads and end up getting a good portion of the concessions for themselves because, they say, they too are 4 Philippine Constitution Article XII, section 2,1987; Article XVI, section 8,1973; Commonwealth Act 141,1963; Presidential Decree 1073 , section 4,1977 Presidential Decree 1529, sections 14 and 35,1978. 'Lumads'. They use their knowledge of the ways of the state to gain leadership among the indigenous peoples but end up sequestering most of the benefits accorded them. This is a new form of colonialism -a kind of 'turncoat colonialism' -where the colonizers take over the leadership of the colonized by pretending that they are one of them. This was certainly not the intention of the indigenous peoples when they aspired to take over control of their ancestral domains. It contradicts the rationale for the state and the indigenous peoples that if, on the part of the state, it were to exercise full control of their domains, they clearly establish the identity of the legitimate users of the domain (Caballero 1991) .
The third issue is setting the boundaries of the domains. What is the physical extent of each domain? What lands and resources constitute the domains of the different indigenous groups? The issue may be broken down into three separate but related questions: A. the delineation of the boundaries of the domains B. the level of social organization into which the domains may be disaggregated and C. the physical continuity of the domains.
A. Boundary-setting should be acceptable to both the state and the claimants, and acceptability begins with methodology. The question is, which method is acceptable to the parties, those of the state, involving geodetic surveys and mapping, or those of the indigenous peoples, which make use of landmarks and fluid approximation (Van der Veur 1982) ? The two are mutually exclusive; each one violates a principle of the other. For example, geodetic surveys require precision as a basis of enforcement, while for indigenous boundaries, precision is less important than practical enforceability (Prill-Brett 1984;  Van der Veur 1982) .
B. Social organization among indigenous peoples may not be homogenous enough for easy delineation of the domains. Groups may be disaggregated socially, such that tribes, villages or clans may differ on their views as to what constitutes their individual or collective domains (Prill-Brett 1984) . Claims may need to be circumscribed not only across groups but within groups as well. The question is, at what level of social organization should the boundaries be based? There is the practical consideration that the higher the level of the social group on which the boundaries are based, the harder it will be to identify qualified claimants , thus increasing the likelihood that non-qualified claimants will be able to snatch the benefits that should have been accorded to qualified groups. If the group becomes smaller, the collectiveness of the claim becomes smaller as well. This would negate the presupposition that indigenous peoples seek to have control over their ancestral domains because they desire to articulate their unique cultural lifestyle as a whole rather than merely to provide better economic support for a village, clan, or family in their group. C. Physical continuity refers to the contiguity of the land and resources included in the claim. There is always the possibility that for some claimants, their ancestral domains lie in scattered territories. They use different areas and different resources over a wide stretch of land, to support life (or as a basis of livelihood) in different seasons or economic conditions. The domain is not physically contiguous but distributed over time and space (Cadelina 1982) . In these cases, boundary setting will be a complicated affair, even more so if more than one group uses an area for different purposes at different times (Watanabe 1977) .
These issues are interrelated and intertwined. They need to be understood in terms of how each poses implications for the others. The issues need to be assessed as to how they affect the use of, and control the of access to, ancestral lands and resources. This makes the debate on ancestral domains in the Philippines a convoluted and complex affair.
Alternative approaches to understanding the issues on ancestral domains in the Philippines
The present Philippine republic maintains ascendant rights over ancestral domains based mainly on the regalian doctrine (A. Gatmaytan 1992; La Vina 1991; Lynch 1984) . But because the republic, with likewise ascendant coercive capacities, has chosen to exercise dominion over the domains, there is hardly any point in discussing why the doctrine must be affirmed. The onus of the current debate is to show why the doctrine is not valid and to convince the republic that it must recognize the validity of ancestral claims.
There are three approaches to understanding the issues on ancestral domains in order to assess the invalidity of the regalian doctrine. These are: historical, political, and legal. They offer instructive views on the legitimacy of ancestral claims, the identity of the claimants, and the boundaries of the domains, all of which might prove useful when evaluating the regalian doctrine as the basis of policies to resolve the issues.
A. Historical approaches. Ancestral domain claims may be viewed as claims to certain tenure rights over lands and resources, based on uninterrupted occupancy and use across time (Lynch 1984 ; see Saleeby 1913) . Ancestral claims are seen to be akin to how the Philippine republic validates its territorial claims, which likewise uses historical presence.and control as the basis of its claims. The republic, as a derivative of Spanish colonial rule, refers to the prior Spanish control of the archipelago as the basis of its territorial sovereignty (Brecher 1963) .
Presence and prior control are the republic's reasons behind the validation of its territorial claims, which are not much different from the reasons used by indigenous peoples in validating their claims. In this view, ancestral claims are seen as being valid on much the same grounds that the Philippine republic maintains that its territorial claims are valid. For the republic to assert otherwise would negate the validity of its own territorial claims.
It may be argued, of course, that power distinguishes the case of ancestral claims from those of the Philippine republic to its territory. An argument may be made that claims are only as good as claimants' ability to enforce them. Because indigenous peoples are unable to vie with the state in enforcing their claims, they lose out.
While the argument has its practical merits, it might be noted that there are abundant cases in which states continued to assert their claims over certain territories, even when the territories had beenlost earlier to other states (Turkey and Greece in the Mediterranean; Irian Jaya in eastern Indonesia). This implies that to states, loss of continuity in exercising control, or the inability to enforce a claim, are not per se a sufficient basis for invalidating a claim.
5 Consequently, the validity of ancestral domains is not expunged by sheer imposition of state power over the domains. The historical validity of the claims persists even in the face of state power being ascendant in the domains. Power is irrelevant to the validity of the claims. Suppression does not falsify a claim.
The matter of identity of ancestral domains might be viewed as being a question of historical affinity to indigenous groups. This is supported by the fact that the same principle is used by the Philippine republic for defining citizenship (Espina 1981) . It allows citizenship on the basis of sanguinary or juridical affiliations to its constituent communities. The same options may be used in determining affinity to indigenous groups, so that the identity of the claimants may be determined by the indigenous peoples themselves, much as the state does with respect to its citizens.
Extent of claims may be viewed in terms of historical reach of domicile and use of land and resources. Claimants may present evidence of extent of occupancy and use of areas over time. The Philippine republic would be hard put to deny indigenous peoples these rights, because it appeals to the same evidence of historical reach of authority and control as the basis of determining the boundaries of its territorial claims.
B. Political approaches. The creation of the modern Philippine state out of prior colonial claims brought about a situation in which 1. political authority of the state was deemed to reach areas not otherwise included in the realm of its actual control (Lynch 1984) , and 2. peoples who otherwise wanted to be 5 See the case of Dupleix's capture of Madras in 1746 and its subsequent 'restoration' to English control two years later (Brecher 1963) . left alone were made citizens of a state that they did not help create and to which they did not belong (A. Gatmaytan 1992) . This is the tragedy of the indigenous peoples of the Philippines: they succeeded in escaping from foreign colonization, but got colonized by the modern Philippine state.
Is the colonization of the indigenous Filipinos by the Philippine republic legitimate and valid? It would appear not. For if the republic founds itself on the rejection of colonization, it has no political basis for taking up the practice itself. It might as well reject the principle underlying its own founding.
The present Philippine republic derived its political and state jurisdiction from the Spanish colonial antecedents. Spain had claimed in the Treaty of Paris in 1899 that its rule extended throughout the Philippine archipelago from Batanes in the north to Sulu in the south and from Samar in the east to Palawan in the west. But to claim is one thing, to control is another, and authority is established by actual control rather than mere claims. A claim can be extended by the sheer capacity to utter it, whereas control substantiates full authority over a territory. Thus, if the present republic's reach of authority were to be based on the reach of Spanish colonial rule, then it could only extend to areas in the archipelago which were then under the control of alcalde-may ores, gobernadorcillos, or corregidores at the time of the Spanish. It could not include ancestral areas that were never under the authority of Spain.
If the present Philippine republic were to desist from being itself a colonizer, much as it was founded upon the rejection of colonialism, then it cannot include in its compass of state authority any area within the archipelago that never fell under Spanish control, any more than it could include areas outside the archipelago which Spain did not colonize.
Control and exclusion may be viewed as inherent political rights of constituent assemblies (Kirchner 1969; Brecher 1963) . Consequently, indigenous peoples may be recognized as having the right to determine who shall qualify as members of their group, which means the right to determine who shall be included (or excluded) from their assembly. This would allow indigenous peoples to adjudicate their own constituencies in much the same way that citizens of modern states adjudicate theirs.
Self-determination may likewise apply to delineating the boundaries of ancestral claims. Indigenous peoples may be recognized as having the inherent right to determine the extent of their realm, much as modern communities and states routinely do so. In this case, indigenous peoples may need to negotiate with contending claimants (other groups, or the state itself) to pose their boundaries against those set by others. Indigenous peoples are certainly capable of using negotiation to resolve territorial disputes with neighbours (Lynch 1984; Scott 1982; Plasencia 1979 ).
C. Legal approaches. The regalian doctrine is used by the modern Philippine republic as its principal legal basis for withholding recognition (D. Gatmaytan 1992; La Vina 1991; Lynch 1984) . There are at least two views on the juridical validity of the doctrine: either it is valid, or it has no basis in fact.
Those who claim it is valid base their view on the principle that sovereignty implies absolute authority. There is to be no authority above the state. If the state opts to reserve certain rights over any of its subjects, or over any object in its jurisdiction (land, water, forests, minerals), no other entity may appropriate those rights unless permitted by the state. If the Constitution, after having been duly promulgated and adopted through processes considered acceptable by the citizenry, reserves for the state certain rights over the lands and resources it deems remain in the public domain, then there is absolute legal validity to the state's refusal to recognize ancestral domains.
Those who deny the validity of the regalian doctrine regard it as having no clear factual basis, which means that the Philippine republic cannot appeal to it as a valid legal reason for withholding recognition of ancestral domains.
It is argued that existing stipulations of the regalian doctrine in the constitution of the present Philippine republic are based on previous American colonial laws on public lands (Lynch 1984; A. Gatmaytan 1992) . These laws (the Land Registration Act of 1902, the Public Lands Act of 1905 and Public Land Law Acts of 1913,1914 and 1919) declare that all lands and resources in the country not previously alienated by Spain or the United States (in both cases evidenced by paper titles), are 'public domains' and are therefore the property of the state (Duhaylungsod 1996 , see Leonen 1993 Lynch 1984; Fernandez 1976; A. Gatmaytan 1992; Lynch 1984) . Lynch (1984) presents evidence that the Spanish crown never intended to consider all lands in the Philippines as its property. In 1580, King Philip II had ordered all Spanish friars and soldiers in the country 'not to deprive native Filipinos of their lands' (Lynch 1984) . 6 Thus the historical basis of the American doctrine of 'public lands' (as erstwhile Spanish 'crown lands') is factually false. In turn, the historical antecedents of present constitutional stipulations of 'public lands' in the Philippines are factually invalid, so their legality is tenuous if not downright suspect (Lynch 1984; see D. Gatmaytan 1992) .
It may be argued that existing constitutional stipulations are valid in themselves. They need not have historical antecedents in order to be valid. The mere fact of their being in the constitution establishes their validity. While the argument can be granted, it does not negate the fact that 'public lands' do need to have a factual basis, nonetheless. Public lands cannot include lands that were never part of the country. If Spain never included certain lands in the archipelago within the compass of its rule, then the American decision to include them based on their having been part of the colony of Spain is void right from the start.
What might be emphasized at this time is that the Treaty of Paris, which ceded the Philippines to the Americans in 1899, only described the outer limits of the Spanish colony in the archipelago. It was only an assumption on the part of the Americans to believe that the colony extended to all lands inside the archipelago. That there were, in fact, inner boundaries to the Spanish colony in the Philippines was confirmed by the United States Supreme Court in Carino v. Insular Government in 1907, a ruling that has been repeatedly affirmed by the Philippine Supreme Court (D. Gatmaytan 1992; Lynch 1984) . The ruling stated that Spanish colonial rule did not extend to the plaintiff's land so that it cannot be held to be 'public domain' under the American colonial regime that followed the Spanish. In effect, whatever regalian claims the United States made after 1899 may not legally include ancestral domains which were factually excluded from prior Spanish rule. Lands and resources that never fell under the Spanish cross or sword were never part of the archipelago that Spain ceded to the United States in 1899. They are not encompassed by the legal presuppositions of 'public lands' under the American regime. They never were. The regalian doctrine, for whatever it is worth, cannot be extended, and never could be extended, to ancestral domains any more than it can be extended in China or Timbuktu. In this view, the validity of ancestral domains, the identity of their constituencies and their boundaries, are not for Philippine laws to adjudicate because they never fell under the compass of Philippine jurisprudence. In fact, they have never fallen under the compass of the authority of the Philippine republic.
Policy options for resolving the issues of ancestral domains in the Philippines
The historical, political and legal bases for recognizing that indigenous peoples have ascendant dominion rights over their ancestral domains are as compelling as they are clear. The modern Philippine republic would be hard put to deny them because to do so would mean denying the basis of its own existence. Self-contradiction alone should compel the state to recognize ancestral claims.
But the debate on ancestral domains in the Philippines is also a scarcity debate. It is equally compelling to go beyond resolving historical facts, political theory, or legal doctrines. There is a need to put aside the conceptual dif-faculties and to look into the actual struggle of indigenous peoples with dominant and christianized Filipinos over the lands and resources held by the former. There is a need to go beyond how and why ancestral domains should be recognized by the state and to address the fundamental question of how much of the lands and resources will go to either the dominant majority or to the powerless minority (Duhaylungsod 1996; Lynch 1984) . The debate is complicated. It requires that the historical, political and legal issues be resolved in a manner that at the same time resolves the scarcity aspects of the problem. The following policy approaches may be appropriate:
1. View ancestral domains as local government units (LGUs). Ancestral domains may be viewed as never having been within the territory of the present Philippine republic. They are physically within the country, but outside its boundaries. Hence, they cannot be a part of the Philippines any more than Antarctica is.
But for purely practical reasons, and considering that, over time, indigenous peoples have, in fact, participated in state functions like elections and local governance, it might not be entirely possible to limit Philippine sovereignty so as to exclude ancestral domains (that is, to exclude an area within the country from the purviews of state sovereignty, a concept of 'internal territorial exclusion', so to speak). What may be a more tenable policy approach is to use internal exclusion as grounds not for outright exclusion of all ancestral domains from the reach of Philippine sovereignty, but for recognizing that indigenous peoples have dominion rights over their lands and resources (D. Gatmaytan 1992) . While it may not be practicable to entirely retract state sovereignty from ancestral domains on the basis of their historical, political and legal exclusion from the republic, neither may it be entirely tenable to fully subjugate them to total domination by the state. A happy medium must be arrived at, and that will have to minimally include the recognition of domains as having valid rights and being autonomous in terms of being governed locally by their indigenous constituencies. The political and legal principles underlying the Local Government Code (LGC) may be applied to ancestral domains. They may be recognized as 'local government units' (LGUs) with rights to make laws of local application, to plan and implement community development and local environmental and resource management schemes, and to otherwise govern the domain. In cases in which the national government finds it necessary to utilize resources found in a domain, it may negotiate for access to them in much the same way that LGU collaboration and concurrence is called for in the LGC in similar circumstances elsewhere.
2. Allow local registration of constituencies. The constituent assemblies of ancestral domains 8 might be recognized to possess the inherent authority to distinguish who shall qualify as the constituency of the domain. They may impose purely customary processes to distinguish and determine who shall be the citizenry of the domain. 3. Use the recorded reach of Spanish taxation as a basis of delineating domains. The territorial derivation of the Philippine republic is based on the actual reach of Spanish colonial control. The extent of the control may be indicated by the reach of Spanish taxation at the time. However, because it cannot be assumed that all areas not reached by Spanish taxation were in fact under the control of indigenous peoples, it may be wise to include only some of the areas not covered by Spanish taxation. On-ground realities, such as the presence of nearby groups, may be taken into account in the negotiations. Self-interest will ensure that delineations will remain within the capacity of claimants to negotiate with others. Claimants will not find it in their interest to extend claims to what will be disputed by others, because to engage in disputes will only delay their full control of their land.
The second and third approaches would be consistent with the first, but have the additional element of self-determination as an inherent right of indigenous peoples. These approaches can be expected to lead policy formation in the direction of vesting indigenous peoples with statutory authority in determining their constituencies (whether based on culture or otherwise) and the boundaries of their dominion. Because the approaches encourage limits on how much land and resources will be included in domains and promote negotiation as an instrument for taking into consideration the interests of others who may have certain rights to the domain, they provide a basis for steering policy formulation toward addressing scarcity aspects of the issue of ancestral domains as well.
entirely similar to actual LGUs elsewhere. Adjustments might need to be made in the arrangement to allow for ancestral domains to be governed on customary principles. The political presuppositions of regular LGUs are not similar to those of ancestral domains so these need to be considered in designing the arrangement. 'Supervision' by national government agencies and the terms for recognizing state authority may need to be adapted to be consistent with local customs and traditions. This finds precedence in the special law creating the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).
8
As may be constituted by the indigenous people themselves prior to state recognition of their domain, based on customary procedures adopted by consensus or general acceptability by those residing in areas circumscribed by the domain.
Conclusion
Ancestral domains are scenes of extensive and intense conflict over lands and resources in the Philippines today (Leonen 2000; Duhaylungsod 1996; TABAK1990) . Not infrequently, the conflict has resulted in death and the displacement of peoples and communities (TABAK 1990; Lynch 1984) . And the situation is not getting better. With its elements of land and race, the conflict has the potential of erupting into a cataclysmic social upheaval (Young 1980) that is, unless it is resolved soon, decisively and effectively.
By the time the program ended on 6 June 1998, DENR had awarded 181 Certificates of Ancestral Domain Claims (CADCs) covering an area of 2,546,035 hectares, for 74,408 claimants. DENR has likewise awarded 128 Certificates of Ancestral Land Claims (CALCs) as of 7 May 1998. These cover 10,038 hectares for 3,646 claimants. But CADCs and CALCs are mere certifications of claim. They do not in fact award dominion rights as a basis for indigenous people to claim (and be recognized as having) ascendant tenure rights to their domains (DENR 1993; A. Gatmaytan 1992) .
In 1997, the Congress of the Philippines enacted RA No. 8371 (otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act). This piece of legislation provided for the recognition of the ancestral domain rights and right to selfdetermination of indigenous peoples (IPs). It also created the National Commission of Indigenous People (NCIP) as the main government agency responsible for the implementation of the provisions of IPRA. The creation of NCIP automatically terminated the DENR programs for IPs and its jurisdiction over resources found inside ancestral domains.
Furthermore, the IPRA also granted the IPs (through NCIP) full authority to determine the extent and boundaries of ancestral lands and to utilize and dispose of the resources inside their ancestral domains.
The NCIP is likewise authorized to issue the Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) and Certificate of Ancestral Land Title (CALT). CADCs and CALCs previously issued by the DENR were the first to be converted to CADT and CALT, respectively.
As expected, IPRA encountered stiff opposition from those who would be affected by its implementation. A resolution was filed in the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of some of the provisions of the Act. To date, the IPRA is yet to be implemented, pending decisions of the Supreme Court.
The conflict is a mish-mash of constitutional confusion, which is not helping an already confused situation of competition for land and resources. The confusion arising from the identity of the Philippines as a state and a country is fundamental. It is a country in that it refers to a physical unity of land and people bounded in space (the Philippine archipelago) and in time (from the Spanish colonial times up to today). It is a state in that it is recognized by similarly organized peoples of the world as a political entity whose legitimacy is derived from some historical and legal antecedents of continuing governance and control of the territory. The confusion, stemming from the assumption that the country is the same as the state, or that the boundaries of both are the same, is hampering the development of policies that realistically recognize that the Philippines, as a country, is not entirely encompassed by the legitimate reach of the authority of the Philippines as a state. Competition for lands and resources inside the country but occurring outside the state must be addressed differently from those inside the country and occurring inside the state. This confusion is the root of the conflict surrounding ancestral domains in the Philippines. It must be addressed as such.
The approaches to addressing the conflict will need to be sophisticated in order to be effective. They need to address the intellectual issues attendant to the conflict and the real issue of scarcity from which the conflict derives intensity and momentum. And not least, they need to address the conflict in such a way that the limits of state authority within the country are aptly reflected in the solution, perhaps by allowing for local governance by local constituencies.
The policy approaches proposed in this article take into account the preceding qualifications. But they are mere guidelines for policy formation. Specific policies would need to address detailed mechanisms and arrangements of governance, identification of claimants and delineation of claims to make possible an effective final resolution of the issue of ancestral claims in the Philippines.
It will be difficult, but it is necessary -and urgent.
